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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LOGAN CITY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
-vs-
LOWELL D. CARLSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
: Case No. 920739-CA 
: Case Type: APPEAL 
: Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Brief of Appellee, page 2-3 states the following: 
1. Jerren Barson, a 16 year-old boy, acting under the 
direction of the State Health Department and the Logan City 
Police department attempted to purchase cigarettes from 20 
stores in Logan City during a routine compliance check 
(Transcript p. 71-75). 
3. None of the other 19 business sold cigarettes to 
Jerren Barson despite his requests for the same. (Transcript 
p. 75). 
This testimony of Jerren Barson is contradicted by 
Plaintiff's Exhibits entered into evidence during the course 
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of the trial. 
Pointing out at page 75 of the trial transcript, 
Jerren Barson testified as follows: 
Q. Do you recall how many stores you went to in all? 
A. I think it was around ten, I—around ten. 
Q. Would that have been just that night, or— 
A. Yeah. That night. All together, it was 20. 
Pointing out at page 78-79 of the trial transcript, 
Jerren Barson testified as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Wyatt) Jerren, I've—itfs two pieces of 
two pages, and I've marked them as Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q. I just want to show that to you and ask you if 
you can identify that. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is— 
A. This is what I wrote after I got back to the 
police station. 
The written statement of Jerren Barson which was marked 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 at trial is enclosed in the addendum. 
It shows that on the night of November 8, 1991, Jerren Barson 
attempted to buy cigarettes at six and not the 10 stores that 
he testified to under oath. [Of the four exhibits entered 
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into evidency by the Plaintiff at trial, none are available 
to Defendant and have not been transmitted to this Court 
for the purpose of this appeal, one of the Exhibits, a news-
paper article published in the Herald Journal further con-
tradicts Jerren Barson's testimony at trial]. 
The testimony of Jerren Barson also shows that he did 
not misrepresent his age when attempting to buy cigarettes 
at the other stores in Logan, Utah. (Trial Tr. 70-79). 
DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. (See 
Addendum). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RESPOND TO DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
THAT HE WAS DEPRIVED EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. 
The Defendant in his Brief, Brief of Appellant, page 14-
16 raised the issue that he was deprived of Equal Protection 
of the Laws as secured under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution by being charged by Information 
with a Class B misdemeanor offense under Section 9.24.040 of 
the Revised Ordinances of Logan City rather than with a Class 
C misdemeanor offense as per the citation issued to Defendant 
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on November 8, 1991 under U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as 
amended). 
The Plaintiff in its Brief has failed to respond and 
provide this Court with any rational basis as to why the 
Defendant was singled out and arbitrarily charged by In-
formation and intentionally prosecuted for a Class B mis-
demeanor offense in violation of Section 9.24.040 of the 
Revised Ordinances of Logan City rather than a Class C 
misdemeanor offense under U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as 
amended) as per the citation issued to Defendant. The 
Defendant being intentionally charged by Information and 
prosecuted for a Class B misdemeanor rather than a Class C 
misdemeanor was a denial of Equal Protection of the Laws 
and grounds for dismissal of the Information. Murquia v. 
Municipal Court for Bakerfield J.P., 540 P.2d 44 (Cal. 1975). 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE CRIMINALLY PROSECUTED AND 
PUNISHED FOR A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE WHICH DID NOT 
PROVIDE A VALID CRIMINAL PENALTY. 
The Plaintiff in its Brief, Brief of Appellee at page 8 
concedes that Section 1.16.010 is admittedly inconsistent 
and should be voided in this case. Section 1.16.010 of 
the Revised Ordinances of Logan City provides the penalty 
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for violating Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances 
of Logan City. Clearly, if the penalty for violating a 
municipal ordinance is void than any prosecution under 
the ordinance would be wholly frivolous. The trial court 
in the instant case had no constitutional authority under 
the separation of powers provisions of Article V, § 1 of 
the Utah Constitution to enact or legislate a penalty pro-
vision for Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of 
Logan City. State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977); 
State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah App. 1990); Matheson v. 
Ferry, 641 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982). 
Thus, the prosecution of the Defendant in the instant 
case was wholly frivolous and the penalty imposed against 
him was totally void. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT TAKE THE PROSECUTION'S MOTION 
TO AMEND THE INFORMATION UNDER ADVISEMENT. 
The Plaintiff in its Brief, Brief of Appellee, page 8-
9 states that the trial court took the prosecution's motion 
to amend the Information under advisement. The Plaintiff's 
claim is misplaced and not supported by the trial court record. 
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The record does show that the trial court took the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Information and Defense 
Counsel!s objections to the trial granting the prosecution's 
motion to amend the Information under advisement. 
Pointing out at pages 88-90 of the trial transcript 
the proceedings went as follows: 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Let me respond without calling on Mr. Wyatt. As we've 
gone along in evidence, I've thought about because of the 
Court's uncertainty about the status of the law, the Court 
feels that the best way perhaps to handle the mechanics of 
handling the question at this point, since I have the motion 
under advisement, would be to grant tentatively, at least, 
the motion of the City to amend. 
One of two things is true. Either they have the right 
to amend and treat it as a Class C and instruct the jury on 
a Class C misdemeanor, or they don't have that right. If 
they don't have that right, you get a dismissal anyhow. If 
they do have that right, that's the proper way to go to the 
jury, rather than to let it go as a Class B. 
And so it seems to the Court maybe that that's the thing 
to do, advise the jury that it's prosecuted and the Court's 
going to allow an amendment, that it's prosecuted in the State--
name of the State of Utah as a Class C misdemeanor, we'll 
simply interline on their copy of the instructions, the State 
of Utah in place of Logan City. 
And then if that's a proper way to go, then see what the 
jury does. If that's not a proper way to go, it won't make 
any difference, because the Court's going to--going to make 
a decision and if the Court concludes that's not correct, 
it's going to dismiss the Information and that'll take care 
of it. 
So it seems to me that procedurally, that's—so we 
don't waste our time, that's maybe the best way to dot it. 
Does that sound all right, Mr. Hult? 
-6-
MR. HULT: That sounds fine, your Honor. The 
only thing I want to do because I'm uncertain as to 
whether I did previously, is to place on the record our 
objection to the motion to amend. I think we discussed 
it, but I'm not sure if I stated outright that we object--
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HULT: —to the motion to amend. 
THE COURT: All right. The record will show your 
objection, and I've treated that as if it had been stated. 
The Brief of Appellee at page 9 further states: 
At the conclusion of the trial the court indicated it 
would announce a decision on the 2 motions, both Appellant's 
motion to dismiss and Appellee's motion to amend, at sentencing 
which was to be set at some time in the future. 
Again, the Plaintiff's claim is misplaced and is not 
supported by the trial court record. 
Pointing out at page 112 of the trial transcript, the 
proceedings after the jury returned a verdict went as follows: 
THE COURT: Counsel that moves us on to the next stage. 
Mr. Hult, would you be willing to postpone sentencing while 
the Court considers the questions that you've raised in 
your earlier motions that are under advisement? 
To determine nature of trial court's ruling, Court of 
Appeals looks at substance of ruling rather than label 
attached to it by the trial court. State v. Workman, 806 
P.2d 1198, 1202 (Utah App. 1991). Court of Appeals will 
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review the sufficiency of the trial courtfs findings 
of fact for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 782 (Utah 1991) . 
When reviewing the substance of the trial court!s 
decision and findings of fact for correctness in relation 
to the prosecution's motion to amend the Information. 
There can only be one conclusion that the trial court did in 
fact grant the prosecution1s motion to amend the Information 
subject to a later dismissal if the amendments were not 
correct. The jury in the instant case did in fact find 
the Defendant guilty of the offense of Selling Tobacco to 
a Minor in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) 
in the case of the State of Utah v. Lowell D. Carlsen. (R.55). 
It is the Plaintiff's claim and argument in the instant 
case that is misplaced and not supported by law or the 
record of the trial court. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hyams, 230 P. 349, 
350 (Utah 1924) held that the judgment of the court must in 
all cases be based upon the verdict of the jury, and the 
verdict of the jury must be responsive to the issue joined 
by the indictment or information and the plea of the person 
-8-
on trial thereto, otherwise the court is without juris-
diction to render judgment thereon. 
Thus, the trial court in the instant case lacked 
jurisdiction to render a judgment in the case of Logan 
City v. Lowell D. Carlsen which was not based upon the 
verdict of the jury in the case of State of Utah v. Lowell 
D. Carlsen which was responsive to the Amended Information 
but was not responsive to the orginal Information charging 
Defendant with violating Section 9.24.040 of the Revised 
Ordinances of Logan City. 
POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THE 
ISSUE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF U.C.A. § 76-10-104 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
The Plaintiff claims in the Brief of Appellee, that 
the Defendant is precluded from raising the constitutionality 
of U.C.A. § 76-10-104 for the first time on appeal. The 
Plaintiff does this by claiming that the Defendant was not 
convicted under the statute but under Section 9.24.040 of 
the Revised Ordinances of Logan City, Brief of Appellee, 
pages 10-12. 
The Defendant can challenge for the first time on appeal 
the constitutionality of the statute or ordinance under which 
he was convicted. 
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The pertinent part of Rule 12 (b) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows: 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including 
request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, 
which is capable of determination without the trial 
of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by 
written motion. The following shall be raised at 
least five days prior to trial: 
(1) defenses and objections based upon defects in 
the indictment or information other than that it 
fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge 
an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the 
court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings. 
A challenge to the validity of a statute under which 
a defendant was convicted constitutes a challenge to the 
court's subject matter jurisdiction which can not be waived 
and can be raised for the first time on appeal. Arrington 
v. United States, 585 A.2d 1342, 1344 (D.C. App. 1991); 
State v. Morrey, 64 P. 764-765 (Utah 1901); State v. Beddo, 
63 P. 96 (Utah 1901). 
The Court in Arrington v. United States, supra,n. 2 at 
1344 observed as follows: 
2. The government's contention that only appellant 
Arrington has, in Appeal No. 89-637, preserved this 
issue for appeal, is meritless. Appellants' challenge 
to the validity of the Act, that the statute had become 
invalid and ceased to exist, raises a jurisdictional 
issue. In the absence of a valid statute their pro-
secutions could not be maintained under the Act. 
Challenges to a court's subject matter jurisdiction 
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cannot be waived. See, Super.Ct.Crim.R. 12(b)(2); 
see also Gooding v. United States 529 A.2d 301, 
304n. 4 (D.C. 1987); Adair v. United States, 391 
A.2d 288, 290 (D.C. 1978); Smith v. United States, 
304 A.2d 28, 31 (D.C.) cert, denied 414 U.S. 1114, 
94 S.Ct. 846, 38 L.Ed.2d 741 (1973). 
It is the Plaintiff's contention in the instant case 
that because U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) or 
Section 9.24.040 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City 
fails to establish minimum guidlines or standards relating 
to the Identification requirements relating to tobacco sales 
that the police and prosecutor in the instant case can set 
their own standards. 
Pointing out at page 84 of the trial transcript, Logan 
City Police Officer, J.G. Geier testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. Now, what he told you specifically was that 
the person looked 19, that he'd asked him three times if he 
was 19, and that he said he was 19? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Do you recall him going beyond that and telling you 
that in fact he'd asked the kid what month and what year he 
was born in? 
A. No. I don't recall that. 
Q. Okay. Now, when you said--you said you asked him 
if he had requested an I.D. and Mr. Carlsen said he had not? 
A. Correct. 
Q. You would agree, would you not, with Todd Barson, 
that the State law does not state that a seller of tobacco 
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has to require an I.D.? 
A. That the law--say that again. 
Q. Okay. The State statute does not require a seller 
of tobacco to require an I.D. prior to a sale, does it? 
A. I believe that's true, yes. 
Pointing out at page 85-86 of the trial transcript, 
Officer Geier further testified as follows: 
Q. Do you recall any time that evening, either prior 
to going back to Officer Duron's vehicle, or when you came 
back again and issued the citation, Mr.—telling Mr. Carlsen, 
you can see him in court. 
A. I do recall making a statement to him because of— 
because of the way the conversation was evenually going, 
that after I made a determination to issue the citation, 
I informed him that—that he would need to take it before 
the judge and before the Court--
Q. Okay. 
A. --if he felt that it was unjust. 
Q. But in that context, is it not correct that Mr. 
Carlsen did not believe the person that he had sold to 
looked anything less than 19 years of age, and wanted to 
see him right then and there, see what he looked like? 
A. Well, his initial argument, as I stated, was-- was 
to the effect that his basis for selling it was that he 
thought he was 19, he looked 19 in his judgment, and that 
he'd asked--made inquiry three times as to his age. And he 
stated to me that Jerren had stated he was 19. 
The basis for the citation issued on November 8, 1991 
and the prosecution of the Defendant in the instant case 
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was because the Defendant failed to ask for an I.D. when he 
sold a pack of cigarettes to a person that he thought was 
19/ appeared to be 19/ and represented himself to be 19 years 
of age. Plaintiff's claim/ Brief of Appellee, page 15 that 
the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction because 
Defendant did not ask Jerren Barson for his Driver License. 
The United States Supreme Court was faced with a similar 
issue relating to identification requirements in Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). The Supreme Court held the 
statute in that case to be unconstitutionally vague and facially 
invalid because the statute failed to set minimum standards 
relating to identification requirements and because the statute 
allowed police officers to set their own standards as to 
such identification requirements. 
The instant case has little or no difference to the issue 
resolved by the Supreme Court in Kolender. There being no 
valid ordinance or statute in which to maintain the prose-
cution of the Defendant in this case, the trial court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute the Defendant. 
POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT HAS MARSHALLED ALL RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
TO CONSIDER HIS CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
The Plaintiff's claim. Brief of Appellee/ page 13-14 
that the Defendant has failed to marshall all the relevant 
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evidence before this Court on Defendant's claim of 
insufficient because Defendant did not have the testimony 
of Todd Barson and former Logan City Police Officer, Gil 
Duron transcribed. 
The Defendant did not have their testimony transcribed 
because it is not relevant to the Defendant's claim of in-
sufficient evidence. Furthermore, these two witnesses in-
volvement in this case was testified to by J.G. Geier and 
Jerren Barson. Both Officer Geier and Jerren Barson testified 
that Todd Barson and former Logan City Police Officer, Gil 
Duron were parked in a vehicle over a one-half block away 
when Jerren Barson attempted to buy cigarettes at Carlsen's 
Gas for Less on November 8, 1991. (Trial Tr. 72, 80-81). 
The Defendant's guilt or innocence in the instant case 
must be determined as if the facts were as he perceived them. 
People v. Beardslee, 806 P.2d 1311 (Cal. 1991). 
The California Court of Appeals in People v. Rivera, 
203 Cal.Rptr. 842 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1984) at 846 observed 
as follows: 
A person does not act unlawfully where he commits an 
act under an honest and reasonable belief in the 
existence of certain facts and circumstances which, 
if true, would make the act lawful. [Citation omitted]. 
"When a person commits an act based on a mistake of 
fact, his guilt or innocence is determined as if the 
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facts were as he perceived them. (People v. Osborne, 
(1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 472, 479 [143 Cal.Rept. 582].)" 
Thus, when viewing the facts of the instant case as 
perceived by the Defendant, the Defendant sold a pack of 
cigarettes to Jerren Barson under an honest and reasonable 
belief that Jerren Barson was 19 years of age. Therefore, 
based upon the evidence adduced at trial of the testimony 
of Defendant which is also corroborated by the testimony 
of Officer Geier, there is not sufficient evidence to 
sustain the conviction of the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no theory of the law or a legal basis which 
is based upon the record of this case in which the Defendant's 
conviction could be affirmed and the Defendant therefore 
respectfully submits that his conviction should therefore 
be reversed. 
-15-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
Reply Brief of Appellant's to Scott L. Wyatt, Logan City 
Prosecutor, located at 255 North Main, Logan, Utah, 84321, 
postage prepaid and by placing the same in a U.S. Mailbox 
on this 26th day of August, 1993. 
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A D D E N D U M 
Rule 12 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 654 
tered, that upon trial the prosecution would have 
the burden of proving each of those elements be-
yond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an 
admission of all those elements, 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum -sentence, and if applicable, the mini-
mum mandatory nature of the minimum sen-
tence that may be imposed for each offense to 
which a plea is entered including the possibility 
of the imposition of consecutive sentences, 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, 
what agreement has been reached, 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea, 
and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the 
right of appeal is limited 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of 
guiltv, no contest or guilt\ and mentally ill is not a 
ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the 
ground for extending the time to make a motion un-
der Section 77 13-6 
(g) i l ) If it aDpears that the prosecuting attorney 
or any other party has agreed to request or rec-
ommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, 
the agreement shall be approved by the court 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed 
by the court, the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sen-
tence is not binding on the court 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea dis-
cussions prior to any plea agreement being made 
by the prosecuting attorney 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been 
reached, the judge, upon request of the parties, 
may permit the disclosure of the tentative agree-
ment and the reasons for it, in advance of the 
time for tender of the plea The judge may then 
indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be 
approved 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposi-
tion should not be m conformity with the plea 
agreement the judge shall advise the defendant 
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm 
or withdraw the plea 
d) With approval of the court and the consent of 
the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional 
plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, 
reserving in the record the nght , on appeal from the 
judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of 
anv specified pre-trial motion A defendant who pre-
vails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993 ) 
Rule 12. Motions. 
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be 
by motion A motion other than one made during a 
trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court 
otherwise permits It shall state with particularity 
the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth 
the relief sought It may be supported by affidavit or 
by evidence 
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including re-
quest for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, 
which is capable of determination without the trial of 
the general issue may be raised prior to trial by writ-
ten motion The following shall be raised at least five 
days prior to the trial 
\1) defenses and objections based on defects in 
the indictment or information other than that it 
fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge 
an offense, which objection shall be noticed by 
the court at any time during the pendency of the 
proceeding, 
12) motions concerning the admissibility of ev-
idence, 
t3) requests for discovery where allowed, 
(4) requests for severance of charges or defen-
dants under Rule 9, or 
<5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double 
jeopardy 
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined 
before trial unless the court for good cause orders that 
the ruling be deferred for later determination Where 
factual issues are involved in determining a motion, 
the court shall state its findings on the record 
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise de-
fenses or objections or to make requests which must 
be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court 
shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for 
cause shown may grant relief from such waiver 
(e> Except in justices* courts, a verbatim record 
shall be made of all proceedings at the hearing on 
motions, including such findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law as are made orally 
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in 
the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment 
or information, it may also order that bail be contin-
ued for a reasonable and specified time pending the 
filing of a new indictment or information Nothing m 
this rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of law 
relating to a statute of limitations 
Rule 13. Pretrial conference. 
fa) The trial court, in its discretion, may hold a 
pretrial conference, with trial counsel present, to con-
sider such matters as will promote a fair and expedi-
tious trial The accused shall be present unless he 
waives his right to appear 
(b) At the conclusion of the conference, a pretrial 
order shall set out the matters ruled upon Any stipu-
lations made shall be signed by counsel, approved by 
the court and filed, and shall be binding upon the 
parties at trial, on appeal, and in postconviction pro-
ceedings unless set aside or modified by the court 
Rule 14. Subpoena . 
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance of a wit-
ness or interpreter before a court, magistrate or 
grand jury in connection with a criminal investiga-
tion or prosecution may be issued by the magistrate 
with whom an information is filed, the county attor-
ney on his own initiative or upon the direction of the 
grand jury, or the court in which an information or 
indictment is to be tried The clerk of the court in 
which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the 
defendant, without charge, as many signed sub-
poenas as the defendant may require 
tb) A subpoena may command the person to whom 
it is directed to appear and testify or to produce in 
court or to allow inspection of records, papers or other 
objects The court mav quash or modify the subpoena 
if compliance would be unreasonable 
(c) A subpoena may be served by any person over 
the age of 18 years who is not a party Service shall 
be made by delivering a copy of the subpoena to the 
witness or interpreter personally and notifying him of 
the contents A peace officer shall serve any subpoena 
delivered to him for service in his county 
Selling tobacco to minors 
Merchants chargecTlifter sting 
By Christopher Williams 
staff writer 
Local officials said they weren't blowing 
smoke when it came to the illegal sale of 
tobacco to minors. Following a three-month 
effort by the Logan City Police and Bear 
River Health departments, seven merchants 
have recently been charged with selling 
tobacco to minors. 
That was the final step in a three-step 
process by the agencies to curb the 
availability of smokes to those under the age 
of 19. 
During an August sweep of 10 Logan 
stores, a 16-year-old male undercover buyer 
came out of six of the local businesses with a 
pack of cigarettes in hand. Logan City Police 
SchoolN Resource Officer Gil Duron and 
Health Educator Todd Barson weren't sur-
prised by the 60 percent non-compliance rate, 
but hoped that follow-up meetings with 
owners and managers of 28 local stores would 
increase that compliance rate. 
After that initial sweep, during which no 
one was cited for violations, Duron and 
Barson set up interviews with store personnel, 
shared what happened, explained the state's 
tobacco laws, the health issues associated 
with tobacco use and possible penalties 
employees and employers could face if 
minors were allowed to buy tobacco. 
Following that education process, Duron, 
Barson and the undercover juvenile again hit 
the streets in October and November. Of the 
28 stores hit during that second sweep, only 
seven sold tobacco to the 16-year-old 
However, of those seven stores that sold the 
tobacco, five of them were the same that 
violated the state's tobacco laws back in 
'August ; 
According to Duron, four of those seven 
charged with the class C misdemeanor 
offense have pleaded guilty, two have pleaded 
not guilty and another has a schedule jurt 
appearance. 
"Ninety-nine percent of the stores we've 
worked with have been nothing but positive 
about this," Duron said. "We did have one 
gentleman say he was 'set up/ and I agree, 
yes, he was set up. But we told everyone that 
we'd be sending another individual in with 
the understanding that„ if a violation was 
comn ' d^, legal action would take place.'' 
Although merchants were cited for vio-
lating tobacco laws, Barson said the main 
thrust of the effort was to educate retailers 
about the law and that cigarettes "are the 
leading cause of preventable death and illness. 
"We*re just trying to prevent'illness, 
disease, death and other drug use," Barson 
said, citing a National Institute on Drug 
Abuse study that showed 92 percr of 
adolescent marijuana smokers were iso 
regular cigarette smokers. 
See SALES on page 2 
oaies 
Continued from page 1 
He also cited a DePaul Univer-
sity study that indicated that 
minors turn to retail merchants 
74 percent of the time to 
purchase smokes, and rely on 
family and friends 26 percent of 
the time. 
Smith's Store Director Rod 
Howell had nothing but com-
pliments for the program this 
morning although one of his 
checkers has been fined for 
selling to the undercover minor. 
MMy employuss have really 
become aware of the situation 
and we're ID'ing a lot more 
people/' Howell said "It used to 
be that (police) came down on 
the store. But now that they're 
coming down on die employees, 
my employees realize the money 
(for fines) comes out of their own 
pocket" 
In accordance with Smith's 
store policy, the checker found 
violating the law has received a 
written warning, Howell said, 
adding a second violation would 
result in a week off without pay 
and a third violation would result 
in termination. 
Duron and Barson now plan to 
send letters of commendation to 
store owners and employees they 
found complying with tobacco 
laws and said another undercover 
sweep could again occur within a 
few months. 
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Location of Incident 
7/31 A / /£_ (S> F ? 
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5^J<ft£g 
Telephone Home/Work 
lease describe what you saw, heard or know of this incident 
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So 
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y -th? -Cam*/ Li^kiS' cine/ GSJU* 
u n hook Af march-eS'. J, aa,,-? him 
10 rlnllnr h'll Cmrf h* 
5 and ^ rfr)<? oy>rJ I run-mf, -L 
>Q<; Searc/iea bej &il, 
Not. S 9/ 
I ^ ^ — — — • 
7;a-9 
vou? 
Q- Do you r e c a l l how many s t o r e s you went to i n a l l ? 
A I th ink i t was around t e n , 1—around t e n , 
2 Vtould t h a t have been j u s t t h a t n i g h t , or— 
A Yeah. That n ight - A l l t o g e t h e r , i t was 20. 
Q And t h o s e 20 s t o r e s , how many i n d i v i d u a l s s o l d 
A One* 
Q And that one was? 
** v-arisen s. 
;
* C;vay. 
MR. V7YAT7; T h a t ' s a l l t h a t I h a v e . Thank you* 
Gh, I'm s o r r y * 
Yr . I l u l t ? 
MR. V7YATT. No, I arn d o n e . 
TYY CCUT-T. You ir.ay c r o s s . 
/ a i ~_L v- ^.^ < s t o r e t h a t vou 
v e n t t o , you nave r e r era a m on t h e 
*sO. ^'.icy '.'Cft a^ — i n s i d e , ov/it o * a oG5-» •co.i.nn'. 
Cha*-. T h i - i s t h e c o l v ci.-c ' .-here vc;: s t a v on the 
^•i. 
u 
Yes • 
T h a n k s . 
MR. IiULT: I h a v e no f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s * 
THE COURT; Thank y o u . 
F u r t h e r d i r e c t ? 
MR. WYATT: Y e a h . 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WYATT: 
q u e s t i o n 
A 
** 
s u p p o s e d 
X * 
s u p p o s e d 
J e r r e n , v;hy was i t t h a t y o u d i d n ' t a n s w e r h i s 
w h e n h e a s k e d you how o l d you w e r e ? 
I d o n ' t k n o w , j u s t — n o t h i n g r e a l l y , s a t t h e r e . 
D i d you h a v e a n y i n s t r u c t i o n s a s t o w h a t y o u w e r e 
t o s a y ? 
Y e s . I was j u s t n o t s u p p o s e d t o a n s w e r , I w a s n ' t 
t o t e l l h im a n y a g e . I w a s n ' t s u p p o s e d t o s a y I 
was 19 o r - - i f he a s k e d . 
•k I w a n t t o - - I w a n t t o show y o u s o m e t h i n g — 
XR. WYATT; Maybe I s h o u l d :nark i t j u s t s o t h a t 
I c a n k e e p t r a c k . 
'2 
two p a ^ e . 
1 •« 
you c a n 
1 *r~ 
(By Mr- W y a t t ) J e r r e n , I ' v e — i t ' s two p i e c e s of— 
3 , a n d I ' v e m a r k e d them a s P l a i n t i f f ' s E x h i b i t 4 . i 
Uh huh ( a f f i r m a t i v e ) . 
I j u s t w a n t t o show t h a t t o y o u and a s k y o u i f 
i d e n t i f y t h a t . 
Y e s . 
7£ 
1
 Q What i s — 
2
 A This is what I wrote after I got hack to the 
3 police station. 
4
 Q And would that have been immediately after this 
5 incident? 
6 A Yes* 
7
 Q Okay. 
8 Mi;. vr/ATT: That13 all. Thank you. 
9 I have no further questions. 
10 THE COURT; Further cross? 
11 MR, 1IULT; Ko further cross. 
12 THE COURT: You may step down, Mr. Barson, thank 
13 you. 
14 MR. ?r/ATT: Your Honor, I'd call Officer Ceier. 
15 . UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Scott, they want to know if 
16 they can be excused? 
17 THE COURT; I think the Court's preference would 
18 be that they not he excused at this point. All right. 
19 Than}; y o u . 
20 j . G . G13IER, 
21 called as a witness by and on behalf of the City in this 
22 nutter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the 
23 I witness stand, and was examined and testified as follows 
24 
25 
79 
1
 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2
 BY MR. WYATT: 
3
 * Let ;ae ask you initially if you could tell us 
4
 what your name and occupation is for the record. 
5
 A Ky nanies is James Geier, I'm a patrol sergeant 
6
 with the Logan City Police Department. 
7
 u Okay. Sergeant Geier, I'm going to ask you if 
8 you recall the events of November 8th of this past year? 
9
 A Yes. I do. 
10
 -u And do you recall being at the Carlsen's gas 
11 station on that evening? 
12 A Yes, s i r . 
13 Q What was the purpose of your being there? 
14 A I was assisting Officer Duron when they contacted 
15 Carlsen's in reference to a tobacco sale. 
16 Q O k a y . 
MR. WYATT; I don't think we could get nosier 
doors if we specifically tried to get the^ that way. 
19 TiIE COURT; There is one nosier. 
20 Please go ahead. 
21 Q (liy i:r. uj&tt) What I'd ask you, where \vere you 
22 located at that tir^e, when you were stationed at Carlsen's? 
23 A During the transaction? 
24 - Y e » . 
25 A GGC :%orth and about 5 0 Tast on the north side of 
30 
17 
18 
the road, facing west, in my pa t ro l car . 
u And did you have a view of Jer ren Barson? 
A I had a view of the shed, but not of Jerren a t 
the window. Is i t Jerren? I guess, yes . 
Q Yeah. What did you do tha t pa r t i cu l a r evening? 
A I made contact with Mr. Lowell, af ter the 
individual had come back, with the tobacco in hand. 
U Okay. And can you ind ica te to the jury what your 
conversation with the defendant was? 
A I j u s t informed Mr. Lowell my reason for being 
there and informed him tha t he had ju s t sold tobacco to a 
juveni le of the age of 16, and we had some further 
conversation. He made a statement to the fact that he 
looked 13, and that he had asked him three times how old 
he was, and then had gone on to say m a t he had—Jerren had 
told him tha t he was 19. And I aske-3 him if he'd ever 
asked for any iden t i f i ca t ion or anythinr to ascer ta in his 
age, and he indicated to me that ho had not. 
lie was qui te upset ani—o^«r the circumstances 
ana—a.nd so ^ had another conversation v-ith Officer Duron. 
u And after the second conversation, then what did 
you do? 
A After I had a clear understanding of what 
Officer Huron's in tent ions were and the program tha t he 
head r.-Ce ef for t s on, zhen I returned to Corlsen1 s Shamrock, 
81 
within minutes, and told him at that time that I was going 
to issue him a misdemeanor citation, and did so. 
C Okay. At any time during this conversation with 
the defendant, did he—did he deny selling the cigarettes 
to this individual? 
A No, He did not. 
w In fact, what did he tell you? 
A That he had looked 19 and that hefd asked him on 
three occasions how old he was, and had made a statement 
that Jerren had said that he was IS- And I told him that 
my information was different, and based on the circumstances 
that he'd be issued a citation. 
Q Okay. The person that you've been discussing, 
can you identify hin just for the record? 
A Yes. It's the gentleman to the right, with the 
brown suit coat on. 
£ Okay. The defendant in this case? 
*\ Y es. 
C Mr. Carisen? 
TUT COURT: The record will show the witness 
indicates :ir. Carls en at counsel table. 
You may 'jo ahead. 
MR. V7YATT: That's ail that I have- Thank you 
very much. 
TUT COURT. You may cross-exaaiine. 
82 
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8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY I1R. KULT: 
Q I a s s i rne t h a t when y o u ' r e s a y i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
w i t h t h e b rown s u i t j a c k e t , y o u ' r e r e f e r r i n g t o t h e d a r k 
b r o w n r a t h e r t h a n t h e l i g h t b rown? 
A C o r r e c t . I ' d s a y y o u r s i s t a n . 
Q I n y o u r — d i d y o u i n d i c a t e t h a t y o u d i d n o t h a v e a 
v i e w of J e r r e n a t t h e w i n d o w , b u t y o u o n l y had a v i e w of* 
t h e s h e d ? 
* A I saw him a p p r o a c h t h e s h e d and i t w a s c l e a r t h a t 
h e w a s o n t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e s h e d , b u t I w a s — I d i d n o t 
h a v e v i s u a l c o n t a c t d u r i n g t h e a c t u a l t r a n s a c t i o n , n o . 
Q Okay- When y o u c a u e , w a s i t n i i n u t e s l a t e r o r l e s s 
t h a n a . i d n u t e l a t e r a f t e r J e r r e n h a d made t h e p u r c h a s e and 
t o l d C a r l s e n w h a t had h a p p e n e d , and h e was e x t r e m e l y u p s e t 
when h e h e a r d t h a t ? 
A vrould you a s k t h a t a g a i n ? 
A I r u n o t o u r e I u n d e r s t a n d . 
£ I t s o u n d s l i k e — I t h i n k I c i k e d you a compound 
q u e s t i o n . 
A Y e a h , y o u l i d . 
g now s o o n a f t e r J e r r e n niado h i s p u r c h a s e d i d y o u 
shorf up a t c h e window? 
£'*, ?*i."LIAX r*—vt'.i.tn^.n a r r x n u t e . 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
£ Okay. And you told Mr. Carlsen that you were 
there because he had just sold somebody—tobacco to somebody 
who was under age? 
A Correct. 
5
 I Q And did he immediately get quite upset when he 
6
 I heard that? 
A Well, he—he got on the defensive, if you would, 
as far as his conversation went. 
Q Okay. Now, what he told you specifically was 
that the person looked 19 , that he'd asked him three times 
if he was 19, and that he said he was 19? 
12 I A That's correct. 
13 J Q Do you recall him going beyond that and telling 
you that in fact he'd asked the kid what nionth and what year 
15 I he was born in? 
16 I A IMO. I don't recall that. 
^ Okay. I!ow, when you said—you said you asked him 
if he hal raqucsted an 1.3. and Mr. Carlsen said he had not? 
A Correct. 
2 You "ould agree, would y~u not, vith Todd Barson, 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
14 
17 
18 
19 
20 
24 
21
 tiiat the Ctate law dees net s t a t e cl a: a co l l a r of tobacco 
22
 ' has to require &n 1.2.? 
23 A " ' h a t t h e 1 " W — s a no lew—say tna t again. 
:ay. The S ta t e s t a t u t e -.ocs r/.t require a 
25
 s e l l e r c i i -b i ico to requi re an I.*.. j r i o r i~ a fsale, does 
84 
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19 
20 
1
 I it? 
2
 I A I believe that's true, yes 
3
 a Okay. Is it not true that Mr. Carlsen asked you 
4
 to see this individual that h a d — t h a t had just allegedly 
5 bought the tobacco from hixa? 
6
 A I do not recall that, either. 
7
 Q What was your purpose in going back to the car? 
8 A To talk with Officer Duron. 
9
 Q Okay. is it not true, though, that before you 
10 went back to that car, Carlsen said there is no way that 
11 that kid who had bought the tobacco from hira was less than 
12 19 years of age, he looked 19 years of age, and he wanted 
13 to see him? 
14
 A Ho. I never—don ' t remember any context of t h a t 
15 kind— 
16 I Q Okay. 
17
 I A — i n the conversation, 
w Do you recoil any time that evening, either prior 
o going back to Officer Duron's vehicle, or when you came 
ack again and issued the citation, Mr.--telling r'r. Carlsen,| 
21 I you can see him in court? 
22
 A I do recall making a statement to him because o f — 
23 I because of the vay the conversation was eventually going, 
24 I that after I -riade a determination to issue the citation, 
25
 i Z informed hi::, that—chat he would need to take it before 
4 
6 
10 
11 
1
 t h e j u d g e and b e f o r e t h e Cour t— 
2
 J Okay. 
3
 A — i f h<? felt that it was unjust. 
Q But in that context, is it not correct that 
5 Mr. Carlsen did not believe the person that he had sold to 
looked anything less than 13 years of age, and wanted to 
7 see him right then and there, see what he looked like? 
8 A Well, his initial argument, as I stated, was-r 
9 was to the effect that his basis for selling it was that he 
thought he was 19, he looked 19 in his judgment, and that 
he'd asked—made inquiry three times as to his age. And he 
12 stated to me that Jerren had stated he was 19. 
13 Now, in talking with Jerren at the time, prior to 
14 making contact— 
15 Q W e l l — 
16 A — h e had denied that. 
17 Q Okay. 3ut getting back to my question. You, at 
18
 some point, indicated that Mr. Carlsen could see him in 
19 Court a n d — 
20 A l \o, I neve r s a i d t h a t . 
21 Q Okay- Y o u - - y o u - - I t a k e i t you— 
22 A I would not have said that. I -id n o t — 
23 Q You don1 t ct this point recoil I-'r. Carlsen 
24 asking to see this person that had bcucht ~^ 'rt ^r>u-: 
25 that night? 
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A 
r e c a l l . 
Q 
seconds. 
Xo. I do note 
T h a t ' s n o t 
Okay. 
MR. 2ITJLT; 
THE COURT: 
t o s a y he d i d n ' t a s k , b u t I d o n ' t 
I d o n ' t have any f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s . 
Thank you . 
F u r t h e r d i r e c t ? 
MR, V7YATT: 
THE COURT: 
MR. WYATT: 
THE COURT: 
No, your Honor. 
You may s t e p down, Mr. G e i e r . 
Your Honor , i f 1 c o u l d have j u s t 30 
You may. V7e'11 go o f f t h e r e c o r d . 
(Off t h e r e c o r d . ) 
MR. V7YATT: The C i t y would r e s t a t t h i s t i m e . 
THE COURT: A l l r i g h t , V7ef 11 go back on t h e 
r e c o r d , i f w e ' r e n o t a l r e a d y . 
The C i t y ha s r e s t e d . 
Mr- K u l t , you may go ahead . 
MR. iiULT: Your Honor , I vrondcr i f , a t t h i s t i m e , 
i t would be a p p r o p r i a t e fo r me zo renew my m o t i o n t h a t I 
have made p r e v i o u s l y , o r i f t h e Cour t would wish us t o 
p r o c e e d a t t h i s t i m e . 
THE COURT; L e t ' s s e e . Mayhe i t 1 s a p p r o p r i a t e t o 
ke a r e c e s s . L e t ' s e x c u s e t h e i u r y and t a k e t h e t ime we 
to a d d r e s s t h a t l e g a l q u e s t i o n , and t h e n w e ' l l t a k e OU2 
, Ci-i v 
1 recess, too, and then talk about instructions and have the 
2
 jury back and be ready to go. 
3 
4 
7 
8 
14 
Members of the jury, you've heard i t before 
Please don't make up your minds about the case until i t ' s 
5
 I finally submitted to you. Please don't talk among yourselvesj 
6
 I yet about the subject matter of the case, or to anyone else 
about that, or allow them to talk to you about that, and 
please don't be in the company of anybody that is or could 
9
 | be connected with the case. And the bailiff will take you 
10
 I out.for—to begin your recess. 
11
 I The record will show our jurors have left 
12 I Mr. I l u l t ? 
13 J MR # HULT: Your Honor, before presenting the 
defendant's case, and it being usually the time to request a 
15 I directed verdict or dismissal on the basis of lack of 
16 I evidence, if there is a lack; our request at this time is 
17 | for the Court to reconsider the motion that we have made for 
dismissal, and arguments that we have already presented. 
I don't have anything more that I want to present 
at this tine, but 1 just thought that this ir;ight be an 
21 I opportune tine to see if the Court would consider that at 
22
 I -diis time 
23 I T:-T7 COURT: A l l r i g h t . Thank you 
24 Let me respond without callirg on Kr. vryatt. As 
25 I we've -;one a.lon/3 ir. evidence# I've thought about because of 
'08 
18 
19 
20 
4 
9 
10 
14 
18 
19 
1
 the Court's uncertainty about the status of the law, the 
2
 Court feels that the best way perhaps to handle the mechanics) 
3
 J of handling the question at this point, since I have the 
motion under adviseraent, would be to grant, tentatively4 at 
5
 I least, the motion of the City to amend. 
6
 One of two things is true. Either they have the 
7
 I right to amend and treat it as a Class C and instruct the 
8
 | jury on a Class C misdemeanor, or they don't have that 
right. If they don't have that right, you get a dismissal 
anyhow. If they do have that right, that's the proper way 
11
 I to go to the jury, rather than to let it go as a Class B. 
12 And so it seems to the Court maybe that that's 
13 J the thing to do, advise the jury that it's prosecuted and 
the Court's going to allow an amendment, that it's 
15 j prosecuted in the Srate—name of the State of Utah as a 
16
 I Class C misdemeanor, we'll simply interline on their copy 
17 
of the in s t ruc t ions , the State of Utah in ::lace of Logan 
City. 
And then if t h a t ' s a proper way to go, then see 
20
 I what the jury does. If t h a t ' s net a proper way to go, i t 
21
 won1t make any difference, because the Court ' s going to— 
22
 I going to make a decision and i f the Court concludes t h a t ' s 
23
 I not cor rec t , i t ' s going to dismiss the Information and 
24
 I t h a t ' l l take care of i t . 
So i t seems to me tha t procedural ly, t ha t ' s—so we 25 
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don ' t a l l waste our t i n e , t h a t ' s maybe rhe best way to do 
i t -
Does tha t sound a l l r i g h t , Mr, Ilult? 
IIR. HULT: That sounds f ine , your Honor. The 
only thing I want co do because I'm uncer ta in as to 
whether I did previously, i 3 to place on the record our 
objection to the motion to araend. I think we discussed i t , 
but I'm not sure if I s ta ted ou t r igh t t h a t we object— " 
THE COURT: All r i gh t . 
MR. 1IULT: —to the motion to amend. 
THE COURT; Ail r igh t . The record wi l l show your 
object ion, and I ' ve t rea ted that as if i t had teen s t a ted . 
Ilr. Wyattf i s there anything you want to add to 
what we've said? 
MR. WYATT: :;o. I think tha t everything 's been 
said. Thank you 
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but you had to work harder for it. \:e thank you for your 
service in this case. Thank you very much. 
Counsel, that moves us on to the next stage. 
Mr. Hult, would you be willing to postpone sentencing 
while the Court considers the questions that you've raised 
in your earlier motions that are under advisement? 
MR. HULT: We would prefer postponing sentencing, 
would we not, until the Judge has had a chance to rule -on 
the inotions? 
MR. CARLSEK: Yes. 
TilL COURT: I t h i n k t h a t adght be t h e b e s t . Al l 
r i g h t . Thank y o u . 
I s t h a t a g r 
UK. WYATT: 
THE COURT; 
o u t t o b e . 
MR. WYATT: 
THE COURT: 
t o t h a t , I ' n s u r e . 
A l l r i g h t . 
a b s o l u t e l y l o s e i t , i 
g e t b a c k and g e t b u s y 
t o d o . W h a t , 60 d a y s 
t a k e t h a t l o n g , b u t 1 
t h a t ' s a l l r i g h t , Mr. 
e e a b l e , Mr. W y a t t , t o — 
T h a t ' s f i n e . 
- - t h e C i t y , S t a t e , w h i c h e v e r i t t u r n s 
W h o e v e r I air.. 
A s — w h o e v e r you a r e ; h a s no o b j e c t i o n 
L e t ' s s e e , s o t h a t we d o n ' t j u s t 
f I s e t a d a t e f o r s e n t e n c i n g and t h e n 
o n t h i s , n a y b e t h a t ' s t h e b e s t t h i n g 
frorr. now, and I d o n ' t e x p e c t i t t o 
e t rue g i v e vou a s e n t e n c i n g d a t e , i f 
H u l t . 
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